The concept and foundations of infant intersubjectivity

What This Research Found

Colwyn Trevarthen's foundational chapter on infant intersubjectivity represents a paradigm shift in our understanding of early human development. Published in the influential volume Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny and drawing on over two decades of microanalytic research, this work demonstrates that human infants are born with an innate readiness for emotional communication and shared consciousness with others.

Primary intersubjectivity is innate, not learned. Through painstaking frame-by-frame analysis of infant-caregiver interactions, Trevarthen documented that newborns engage in precisely timed emotional exchanges within the first weeks of life. These "protoconversations" involve matching facial expressions, synchronised vocalisations, and coordinated hand movements that follow the temporal patterns of adult conversation. The infant does not learn to communicate; they are born ready to participate in emotional dialogue. This challenges earlier developmental theories that viewed infants as initially asocial beings who gradually develop social capacities through learning. Trevarthen's work demonstrates that the drive toward intersubjectivity—sharing mental states with others—is as fundamental to human nature as the drive for food or warmth.

Mirroring exchanges build the foundations of empathy. The heart of Trevarthen's contribution lies in explaining how mirroring between infant and caregiver constructs the neural architecture for understanding other minds. When an infant smiles and sees their smile reflected in the caregiver's face, a mapping forms: this internal feeling corresponds to this external expression. Through thousands of such exchanges across the first years of life, the infant builds a comprehensive library linking felt emotions to perceived expressions. This is not mere imitation but genuine intersubjective knowing—the infant learns not just to copy but to understand emotional states through shared experience. The foundations of empathy are laid in these earliest exchanges, long before language or conscious memory.

When mirroring fails, development takes a different path. Trevarthen's research carries profound implications for understanding developmental pathology. When caregivers cannot consistently mirror the infant's expressions—because they are depressed, preoccupied, or narcissistically focused on their own states—the infant cannot learn accurate mappings between internal experience and external expression. The mirroring system develops calibrated to abnormal patterns. The infant who looks to their caregiver's face and sees distortion or self-preoccupation develops a fundamentally different relationship to emotional expression than the infant who sees accurate reflection of their own states.

Intersubjectivity requires recognition of separateness. A crucial aspect of Trevarthen's framework is that genuine intersubjectivity requires recognising the other as a separate mind with distinct experiences. This is precisely what the narcissistic parent cannot provide. They look at the infant and see not a separate consciousness to be known and mirrored but an extension of themselves, a mirror for their own validation, or a threat to their fragile self-image. This failure of recognition—this inability to see the infant as genuinely "other"—means that true intersubjective exchange cannot occur, and the infant's mirroring systems develop without the accurate input they require.

How This Research Is Used in the Book

Trevarthen's research on intersubjectivity and mirroring provides crucial theoretical grounding for understanding how narcissistic parenting damages children's developing capacity for empathy and emotional connection. The work appears prominently in the book's exploration of the narcissistic brain and its developmental origins.

In Chapter 9: Brain Chemistry of Misery, Trevarthen's research explains how the "Emotional Mirror"—the mirror neuron system—develops through early intersubjective experience and becomes miscalibrated in narcissism:

"Mirror neurons require proper input during critical periods. The infant who looks to their caregiver's face and sees distortion or self-preoccupation develops a mirroring system calibrated to abnormal patterns. The broken mirrors of childhood become the broken mirror neurons of adulthood."

This citation establishes the developmental pathway from early mirroring failure to adult empathy deficits, explaining why narcissists can cognitively understand others' emotions while failing to feel them.

In Chapter 10: Building the Maze (Diamorphic Scales), the research is cited multiple times to explain the cellular origins of selective empathy:

"Whatever the precise neural mechanism, mirror-like responses are not automatic. They develop through being mirrored."

And later, elaborating on how narcissistic parenting specifically disrupts this process:

"The narcissistic parent does not mirror. They ignore the infant's expressions, or respond with their own unrelated emotional states, or mirror only selectively—responding to expressions that serve their needs while ignoring others."

The culminating insight draws directly on Trevarthen's framework to explain the mechanism of intergenerational transmission:

"We learn to feel by being felt with. When no one feels with us, we learn something else instead."

This deceptively simple statement encapsulates Trevarthen's research and its profound implications: empathy is not innate capacity that can be damaged, but developed capacity that must be built through relational experience. When that building process goes awry, the resulting adult has a mirroring system that works differently—not broken, but calibrated to an environment of emotional absence.

Why This Matters for Survivors

If you were raised by a narcissistic parent, Trevarthen's research validates something you may have always sensed: that the damage began before you could understand it, before you had words, before you could form memories that could later be analysed in therapy.

The foundations were laid before language. Trevarthen's work demonstrates that the most critical intersubjective development occurs in the first two years of life, when the brain is maximally plastic and relational experience is literally constructing neural architecture. If your narcissistic parent could not mirror you accurately during this period, the deficit was encoded before you could think, speak, or remember. This explains why insight often fails to produce change—you cannot think your way out of patterns laid down before you could think. It also explains why survivors often cannot articulate what happened: there were no words when it happened.

The empty mirroring was real. The experience of looking at your parent's face and seeing nothing reflected back—or seeing only their needs, their distortion, their self-focus—was not imagination or sensitivity. Trevarthen's research documents exactly what happens when infants encounter unresponsive or distorting caregivers: they escalate attempts to engage, then become distressed, then eventually withdraw into self-regulation strategies that bypass the relational system entirely. If you learned to regulate alone because no one was there to regulate with you, that was an intelligent adaptation to a developmental environment that offered no alternative.

Your difficulties with attunement make biological sense. If you struggle to know what you feel, if you absorb others' emotions while losing track of your own, if you find genuine mutual emotional exchange unfamiliar and even threatening, these are not character flaws but developmental adaptations. Your mirroring system built itself for an environment where accurate intersubjective exchange was not available. The patterns that confuse and frustrate you now were intelligent solutions then. Understanding this can help you approach yourself with compassion rather than judgment.

The narcissistic parent's failure was in capacity, not choice. Trevarthen's work suggests that genuine intersubjectivity requires developmental experience that the narcissistic parent likely never received. They could not give what they did not have. This is not exoneration—adults make choices about their behaviour—but it may help release the fantasy that you could have done something to be truly seen. The failure was in their mirroring capacity, not in your worthiness of being mirrored.

Clinical Implications

For psychiatrists, psychologists, and trauma-informed healthcare providers, Trevarthen's research has profound implications for assessment and treatment of survivors whose early intersubjective development was disrupted.

The therapeutic relationship must provide intersubjective experience. Trevarthen's work demonstrates that the capacity for emotional resonance develops through relational experience, not insight or instruction. For survivors whose early mirroring was absent or distorted, the therapeutic relationship must become what Trevarthen would call a space for genuine intersubjectivity—attuned presence, accurate emotional reflection, and recognition of the client as a separate mind worthy of understanding. This is not merely supportive context for technique; it is the primary mechanism of change.

Assess for the split between cognitive and affective empathy. Survivors of narcissistic parenting often develop hyperacute cognitive empathy (understanding what others think and feel) as a survival mechanism, while affective empathy (feeling what others feel) remains underdeveloped due to mirroring failure. This creates a characteristic presentation: the client can read others with remarkable accuracy but does not experience emotional resonance. Assessment should distinguish between these capacities, as interventions targeting each may differ.

Nonverbal attunement precedes verbal interpretation. Trevarthen's research emphasises that intersubjectivity operates primarily through precisely timed nonverbal exchange—prosody, facial expression, gesture, timing. The therapist's regulated presence, accurate facial mirroring, and attuned timing communicate at levels beneath conscious awareness. For clients whose damage occurred before language, these nonverbal dimensions of the therapeutic relationship may be more important than verbal content.

Expect unfamiliarity with accurate mirroring. Clients whose early mirroring was absent or distorted may initially find accurate emotional reflection unfamiliar, uncomfortable, or even threatening. Being truly seen may activate fear if being seen in childhood meant being criticised, used, or overwhelmed. The therapist should anticipate this reaction and work gradually, allowing the client to tolerate increasing levels of accurate intersubjective exchange.

Consider body-based and right-hemisphere-engaging interventions. Since intersubjective development occurs primarily through right-hemisphere, nonverbal, body-based experience, interventions that engage these systems directly may access the injury more effectively than purely verbal approaches. EMDR, Somatic Experiencing, sensorimotor psychotherapy, and other body-oriented approaches may work at the level where the developmental disruption occurred.

Broader Implications

Trevarthen's research on infant intersubjectivity extends far beyond individual therapy. Understanding how early relational experience shapes the capacity for mutual emotional understanding illuminates patterns across society.

The Developmental Origins of Narcissistic Pathology

Trevarthen's work provides a clear developmental pathway to understanding narcissistic personality structure. When the infant's intersubjective bids are chronically unmet—when the caregiver cannot recognise and mirror the infant's separate subjectivity—the developing self takes a different course. Without the experience of being known by another, the child cannot fully know themselves. Without the experience of their emotional expressions being accurately mirrored, they cannot develop reliable internal emotional mapping. The false self that characterises narcissism may represent exactly this: a self constructed without the intersubjective foundation that genuine self-knowledge requires. The narcissist's inability to truly see others reflects their developmental experience of not being truly seen.

Intergenerational Transmission of Intersubjective Failure

Trevarthen's framework explains how intergenerational trauma operates at the neurobiological level. The parent who cannot mirror accurately is typically one whose own early mirroring was disrupted. Their mirroring system developed calibrated to absence or distortion, and this is what they transmit to their own children—not through genes or conscious choice, but through the thousands of intersubjective moments where accurate mirroring should occur and does not. Each generation builds its mirroring capacity on what the previous generation could provide, creating chains of intersubjective failure that can persist for generations. Breaking these chains requires intervention that provides the intersubjective experience the parent never received.

The Relational Foundations of Empathy in Society

If empathy is built through early intersubjective experience rather than being a fixed trait, then societal empathy levels are shaped by societal conditions for early caregiving. Policies that support parental mental health, that reduce stress on families with young children, that ensure quality childcare with consistent caregivers, and that identify and support at-risk parent-infant dyads are not merely humane but are investments in the empathic capacity of future citizens. Trevarthen's research suggests that empathy is not a luxury but a developmental necessity, and that the conditions for its development deserve priority attention.

Implications for Autism Understanding

Trevarthen's research has profoundly influenced autism research, suggesting that differences in early intersubjective engagement may underlie some aspects of the autism spectrum. While this connection is complex and debated, it highlights that variations in intersubjective development can take multiple forms with different outcomes. The mirroring failure that contributes to narcissism differs from autism in crucial ways—the narcissist typically develops acute cognitive perspective-taking while lacking affective resonance, while autistic individuals may show different patterns. Trevarthen's framework provides conceptual tools for understanding these variations developmentally rather than as static traits.

Legal and Policy Considerations

Family courts making custody decisions rarely consider intersubjective capacity, yet Trevarthen's research suggests it may be among the most important factors in child development. A parent who cannot engage in genuine intersubjective exchange—who cannot see the child as a separate mind worthy of understanding—is failing the child developmentally, even when physical needs are met and no observable abuse occurs. This creates challenges for legal systems that rely on behavioural observation, but it suggests the importance of including developmental assessment in custody evaluations.

Educational Applications

Teachers interact with children during critical developmental periods. Trevarthen's research suggests that educational environments should prioritise intersubjective quality alongside academic content. The teacher who genuinely sees each student as a separate mind with valid experiences provides developmental nutrition that cannot be replaced by curriculum content. Conversely, educational practices that emphasise compliance over understanding, that fail to recognise student subjectivity, may compound early intersubjective deficits.

Limitations and Considerations

Responsible engagement with Trevarthen's work requires acknowledging several important limitations.

Observational methods have constraints. Trevarthen's conclusions are based on microanalytic observation of infant-caregiver interactions. While rigorous, such observation cannot directly access neural mechanisms or definitively establish causation. The link between observed intersubjective exchange and later developmental outcomes is supported by longitudinal research, but the specific neural pathways remain partially inferential.

Cultural variation in caregiving practices. Trevarthen's early work was conducted primarily with Western samples. While he has explored cross-cultural variations, questions remain about how intersubjective development manifests across cultures with different caregiving norms. The specific expressions of intersubjectivity may vary culturally, even if the need for some form of mutual emotional recognition is universal.

Translation to clinical intervention. Trevarthen's research describes developmental processes but does not directly specify clinical interventions. How therapists should translate "provide intersubjective experience" into specific practices remains a matter of clinical judgment and ongoing research. The optimal "dose" and form of therapeutic intersubjectivity for adults with different developmental histories is not yet established.

The role of temperament. Infants differ in their intersubjective capacities and needs from birth. Some infants may require more intense mirroring to develop secure intersubjectivity; others may be more resilient to mirroring failures. The interaction between infant temperament and caregiver behaviour is complex, making simple cause-effect narratives incomplete.

Distinguishing types of mirroring failure. Not all mirroring failure produces the same outcomes. The depressed mother who cannot engage differs from the narcissistic mother who engages but distorts, who differs from the abusive mother who engages with hostility. Trevarthen's framework provides broad principles, but the specific impacts of different types of mirroring failure require further research.

Historical Context

Colwyn Trevarthen's work on infant intersubjectivity emerged from a remarkable scientific journey spanning hemispheric specialisation research at Caltech with Nobel laureate Roger Sperry to pioneering infant observation at the University of Edinburgh. His shift from studying the divided brain to studying infant communication was not a departure but an evolution—in both cases, he was asking how different aspects of mind coordinate to create unified experience.

When Trevarthen began studying infant-caregiver interaction in the 1970s, the dominant view held that infants were initially asocial, gradually developing social capacities through learning and cognitive development. Piaget's influential framework focused on the infant as individual problem-solver, treating social understanding as a later cognitive achievement. Trevarthen's microanalytic observations challenged this view fundamentally, demonstrating that infants engage in sophisticated social communication from the earliest weeks of life.

His concept of "primary intersubjectivity" proposed that the capacity for emotional sharing is innate—a product of evolution that prepares infants for social connection from birth. The discovery of "protoconversation"—the precisely timed exchanges of expression, vocalisation, and gesture between infant and caregiver—provided empirical evidence for this inborn social capacity.

The 1998 chapter synthesised two decades of research and appeared at a crucial moment. The discovery of mirror neurons by Rizzolatti and colleagues in the 1990s was creating excitement about neural mechanisms for understanding others' actions and intentions. Trevarthen's developmental perspective provided theoretical context for these findings, explaining how mirror systems develop through early experience and what happens when that development goes awry.

The work has been cited over 40,000 times and has influenced fields from infant mental health to autism research to music therapy. Trevarthen's insistence that infants are active participants in emotional communication, not passive recipients of caregiving, revolutionised developmental psychology and provided scientific foundation for attachment-based interventions.

Now in his nineties, Trevarthen continues to write and lecture, extending his framework to understand musicality, play, and the evolutionary origins of human social cognition. His work has generated a research tradition that continues to explore how early intersubjective experience shapes the developing brain and creates the foundations for all later social understanding.

Further Reading

• Trevarthen, C. (1979). Communication and cooperation in early infancy: A description of primary intersubjectivity. In M. Bullowa (Ed.), Before Speech: The Beginning of Interpersonal Communication (pp. 321-347). Cambridge University Press.
• Trevarthen, C. & Aitken, K.J. (2001). Infant intersubjectivity: Research, theory, and clinical applications. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42(1), 3-48.
• Stern, D.N. (1985). The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology. Basic Books.
• Meltzoff, A.N. & Moore, M.K. (1977). Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates. Science, 198(4312), 75-78.
• Beebe, B. & Lachmann, F.M. (2014). The Origins of Attachment: Infant Research and Adult Treatment. Routledge.
• Schore, A.N. (1994). Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The Neurobiology of Emotional Development. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
• Gallese, V. (2001). The 'shared manifold' hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5-7), 33-50.